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Abstract—Until recently, all the security measures have
addressed servers or networks while clients or network endpoints
have missed the required security concerns relatively. Most of
the mechanisms safeguarding endpoints (clients) are software
based. Making endpoints survive in open and reasonably exposed
environments-like internet-demand that client security should
stand by a tried and true dependence and merely software
based mechanisms are inadequate in providing the desired
security level. Trusted Computing (TC) initiatives solve these
security problems through operating environments, applications
and secure hardware changes to the personal computer. Using
secure hardware as a basis for trusted computing provides a level
of relevance since hardware-based security is mooted difﬁcult
to compromise than conventional approaches. Therefore, TC
provides a powerful set of features to implement applications
such as secure auctions, integrity measurement, and biometric
identifcation. In this paper, we present a detailed discussion of
the different approaches towards a trusted computing platform;
examine these approaches and provide a set of attack mechanisms
enforced if trusted initiatives are not employed at user-level. The
future directions along this line of research are also conferred.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Network security is the key factor in the evolution of
the computer software architecture and eventually trusted
technology systems. Since the Network endpoint security has
remained exposed comparatively and the entire security bases
has been dependent on operating systems or high level security
suites as convention, serious ramiﬁcations were always due to
jeopardize the measures guarding these endpoints. To ﬁll the
gap, the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) [1] was
formed in late 90’s and emerged as trusted computing group
(TCG) in 2003.
As a remedy to software only approaches the TCG even-
tually proposed secure and trustworthy setup comprehending
existing capabilities, like the X.509 standard for digital
certiﬁcates, IPSEC (Internet Protocol Security Protocol), IKE
(Internet Key Exchange), VPN (Virtual Private Network), PKI
(Public Key Infrastructure), PC/SC Speciﬁcation for smart
cards, biometrics, S/MIME (Secure Multi-purpose Internet
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Mail Extensions), SSL, SET (Secure Electronic Transaction),
IEEE 802.11 WEP, IEEE 802.1x, etc [2].
TCG’s primary work is the development of an inexpensive
chip, known as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [3] or
the secure hardware, that can help users protect information
assets from compromise due to external software attack
through integrating security standards mentioned above, at the
hardware level. A software based TPM [4] for testing and
research is also available.
TPM veriﬁes the system integrity in network environment,
and turns a system into a trusted one through Core Root of
Trust Measurement (CRTM) including trusted boot, strong
process isolation and remote attestation. The trusted boot
model refers to measuring the control transfer from BIOS to
the boot loader and ﬁnally booting the trusted OS. Strong
isolation provides support to processes against manipulation
by other processes. Virtualization [5] techniques can also
address this issue. Remote attestation [6] is the key process
for satisfying and verifying the authenticity of the platform.
TPM uses 2048 bit RSA for encryption/decryption, SHA-
1 hashes and random number generator. Two types of keys
are required: Endorsement Key (EK) is a pair of public-
private key, Attestation Identity Key (AIK) is used for system
authenticity which essentially differs from user authentication.
Endorsement Certiﬁcate and Platform Certiﬁcates assure the
integrity of EK and secure components respectively.
Another variant of secure hardware is secure coprocessor
[7] and is not speciﬁed by TCG. A secure coprocessor
is a hardware module containing a CPU, bootstrap ROM,
and secure non-volatile memory. This hardware module is
physically shielded from penetration, and the I/O interface to
the module is the only way to access the internal state of the
module.
Figure 1 shows the TC architecture. The architecture is
composed of software and hardware parts – the latter of which
is composed of the TPM and Virtualization modules.
Section I presented the inroduction. In section II, we present
the evolution of trusted hardware assisted security which
ultimately led to the design and implementation of TCG
speciﬁc solution. Section III, discusses the modern industry
standards and section IV describes the research models and
archtectures. Finally, we present the threat model and strength
and weaknesses of TC. In the end, future work and conclusion
is also conferred.
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Fig. 1. Trusted Computing Architectur Overview
II. PRIOR WORK
A. KENT
The early work emerged for software protection using
secure hardware by best in 1970s. This work was taken
up by Kent [8] and enhanced by providing a mechanism
for encrypted storage. The original proprietary software was
installed in the secure hardware through encrypted storage
which was then computed [9].
B. ABYSS
In 1990 an effort by Steve white and Lian comerford,
again proposed a model for software protection as A Basic
York Town Security System (ABYSS) [10]. The model was
secure hardware dependent. ABYSS worked in a partitioned
environment where computations were carried out within the
secure hardware and the rest of the normal or unprotected
system communicated with that [9].
C. CITADEL
ABYSS Model was further carried on by White et al [11],
[12] who proposed Citadel. The citadel improved the ABYSS
protecting only secure software. Citadel provided security
basis for the rest of the unprotected system. Many of the
prototypes emerged from their model [9].
D. DYAD
Yee and Tygar at Carnegie Mellon University used
early security architectures and implemented a system as
DYAD [13], Based on secure coprocessors and support for
microkernel to run. Virtual memory was made available for
secure applications. All the communication to and from the
coprocessor was encrypted and decrypted [9].
In the next section we present the current industry standards
and approaches towards trusted computing.
III. MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND FRAMEWORKS
A. IBM
The concept of applying secure hardware was ﬁrst
introduced by IBM. To enable trust in system execution,
IBM 4758 [14],[15] started as a research project to build a
secure, tamper-resistant cryptographic coprocessor. IBM 4758
is widely used and its recently available successor – the IBM
4764 strengthens the security needs further.
Both the coprocessors 4758/4764 enables the users to prove
its integrity to remote systems through attestation, which
serves as the core of crypto processors [16].
Sailer et al leverages TCG in Integrity Measurement
Architecture (IMA)[3], to enhance the role of the TPM not
only to measure static state of a system but also dynamic
state. IMA is implemented as a Linux Security Module [17]
to measure each executable, library, or kernel module upon
loading and record the SHA-1 hash values into TPM and the
log.
B. AEGIS
A group at MIT Proposed The AEGIS [18] architec-
ture mainly for Digital Rights management (DRM) and
secure/integrated execution of programs. AEGIS initiates
a mechanism which transforms a CPU in to a Trusted
Computing Platform (TCP). Since the CPU contains the secure
secret, all the adversaries roam around the CPU. Consequently,
a secure mode of execution is added to the CPU. The memory
protection is addressed at core level, i.e. a particular memory
area running a program is protected or the complete memory
is left unprotected.
C. XOM
David et al at Stanford proposed Execute Only Memory
(XOM)[19] addressing software protection to put an end to
piracy. In XOM with deﬁned changes, the programs used to
be encrypted using a key and the attorney factor in decryption
remained the CPU. Because CPU had the decryption key,
the programs needed to depend and trust CPU only for their
integrity and protection.
D. INTEL-LaGrande/Trusted Execution Technology (TXT)
Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) [2], [20], [21] a set
of enhanced hardware components designed to help protect
sensitive information from software-based attacks. Trusted
Execution features include capabilities in the microprocessor,
chipset, I/O subsystems, and other platform components.
When coupled with an enabled operating system and enabled
applications, Trusted Execution Technology can help protect
the conﬁdentiality and integrity of data in the face of these
increasingly hostile security environments.
The innovations of TXT include domain separation,
protected execution, sealed storage, a trusted channel to
graphics and input devices, mechanisms for authenticating
the launch of a protected environment, attestation of platform
identity and protected launch. These building blocks will help
enable a new, open, software architecture for security that
can help protect a user’s or corporation’s sensitive information
from software based attacks.
E. Microsoft-NGSCB
Microsoft Next generation secure computing base
(NGSCB)[22] operates in two modes i.e. Normal and Trusted
modes. Normal mode is unprotected and controlled by the
users, while trusted mode is the implementation of TC.
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TPM FEATURE SET
Type of control User Managed
Location/Binding Hard wired
No. of OSs supported 1
Architechture Centralized
Popular OSs Supported Windows Vista/Linux
Library/Software stack TPMd/TrouSers
Leading Initiative NGSCB, TXT, PRESIDIO
Prominent TPM Assissted Secure Electronic Transction(SET),
Frameworks SAM, SHEMP
Enhancements Through TPM S-MIME e-mail, VPN and PKI
Authentication and Wireless
Authentication for 802.1x
Providers Atmel, Broadcom, Inﬁneon
NGSCB has two main components namely NEXUS and
Nexus Computing Agent (NCA).
Nexus is a special kernel for providing process isolation
between normal and trusted modes. It also carries out
authentication and encryption of data. NCA is trusted mode
software which is responsible for communicating with Nexus
kernel.
The main features offered by NGSCB are strong process
isolation, sealed storage, attestation and secured path to users
with the help of TPM.
F. HP ProtectTools
HP ProtectTools [23] Embedded Security is a hardware
security chip – TPM – that integrates the core elements
of trust into the system. This embedded security initiative
provides simple ﬁle and folder encryption and ﬂexible platform
management. The main feature incorporated is unique key
encryption and storing it on highly uncompromised silicon
storage.
The support for wireless users authentication and protection,
strengthened email system, and control over systems
connecting to network for limiting rights access are robust
feature of Hp ProtectTools.
HP-UX Trusted Computing Services (HP-UX TCS)
[24] provides software support for hardware-enforced key
management on supported HP Integrity servers running HP-
UX 11iv2. HP-UX TCS is primarily composed of the
following elements:
TPM drivers for kernel, TCG speciﬁc software stack,
maintenance utilities, commands for user speciﬁc encryp-
tion/decryption and secure storage.
G. AMD Presidio
AMD’s LaGrande equivalent is Presidio [25]. AMD’s
Presidio is initiative towards trusted computing which extends
its predecessor effort of Enhanced Virus Protection (EVP). The
main objective is achieved through certain hardware changes
to processor and chipset features. The secure partitioning and
secure input/output paths have been seriously looked up by
employing a concept such as TPM. Isolated execution space,
Enhanced Virus Protection (EVP), storage sealing and remote
attestation etc are few capability examples offered by AMD
Presidio.
H. DELL
Dell includes TPMs and Wave Systems EMBASSY Trust
Suite software on many Dell Latitude notebooks, Dell
OptiPlex desktops, and Dell Precision workstations [26]. Dell
also anticipates eventually incorporating TPM architectures on
its servers and storage.
I. Apple
Apple does not appear to have plans to use Trusted
Computing [27], [28]. It was planned that Mac OS X will use
the TPM when available (on the Intel Mac platform) to protect
the OS from piracy. Although Open-Source Software (OSS)
support is available, based on the FreeBSD UNIX system, but
it is not yet distributed by Apple [27].
J. ARM-Trust Zone
TrustZone [29]is a security extension introduced by ARM
Ltd. in its ARM 1176 core. ARM is well known for 32-
bit Embedded CPUs, mainly used for PDAs and mobile
phones. TrustZone is a technology to provide a hardware-
based security for the security critical part of the sytem
rather than maintaining the whole sytem in secure state all
the time [30]. The security-sensitive applications are run
executed in a separate memory space which is not accessible
to normal applications. TrustZone is the ﬁrst ARM architecture
to provide hardware based security in its core [31].
Table II shows a comparison of different hardware
architectures from the perspective of their goals and different
approaches.
IV. RESEARCH MODELS AND ARCHITECTURES
A. SAM: A Flexible and Secure Auction Architecture Using
Trusted Hardware
Secure Auction Marketplace (SAM) [32] mitigates chal-
lenges faced by auctioneer/bidders to conduct auctions
efﬁciently. SAM enables the bidders to experience correct
bidding result, conﬁdentiality of bids, and anonymity without
being exposed and trusting the auctioneer. Since auctioneer
could use the auctioning system in their favor.
SAM addresses this problem using secure coprocessor
environment such as IBM 4758. SAM components such as
auction controller and bid collector are loaded onto the secure
coprocessor securely. The trusted software and the secure
coprocessor together act as a secure auction marketplace
(SAM). SAM becomes an authenticated computational entity,
whose internal state and operations cannot be examined or
altered as all the auction speciﬁcations, bids and results are
held and evaluated by SAM; an adversary even one with direct
physical access to that hardware can’t compromise the security
measures.
B. A Trusted Biometric System
Chen et al [34] described a method for biometric identiﬁ-
cation based user authentication in distributed environments.
The main entities in the system are a user, a trusted platform
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COMPARISONS OF HARDWARE ARCHITECTURES (EXTENDED FROM [33])
XOM, AEGIS, CITADEL TCG, NGSCB, TXT, Presidio, ProtectTools ARM
Goal Copy and tamper-resistant software Copy-resistant software Embedded systems
distribution and execution distribution
Require separate hardware? No Yes Yes
Require permanent device secret? Yes Yes Yes
Source of user’s trust Integrity of S/W and Integrity of S/W H/W based separation of
computation results at load time secure S/W
Trust ties users to devices Yes Yes Yes
Security Perimeter Processor chip boundary Procesor, DRAM, chipset etc. Microprocessor
Targets embedded systems No No Yes
using a TPM, smartcard (SC) and a Trusted Biometric Reader
(TBR). The system is supposed to provide a trust establishment
mechanism between the user and the biometric reader. The
user is presented with an integrity report of biometric
mechanism through the trusted system, only then user is to
trust the reader and release his/her sensitive information.
C. SHEMP: Secure Hardware Enhanced MyProxy
MyProxy is an online credential repository developed by
Grid community for providing security and mobility of
sensitive records of users [35]. Secure Hardware Enhanced
MyProxy (SHEMP) [36] was presented as an extensive
architecture for MyProxy by providing strong security basis
supported with secure coprocessors using different hardware at
client and repository. Proxy certiﬁcates (PCs) were integrated
with applications for un-attackable authentication.
Client and repository properties were managed through
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) to
provide users with ﬂexibility for specifying key usage options.
SHEMP have been prototyped and tested. The repository and
a client run on trusted Bear [37].
D. Satem: A Trusted Computing System
A Service-aware Attestation Method (Satem) [38] Towards
Trusted Service Transaction is composed of a trusted agent in
the OS kernel of the service platform and a trust evaluator
on the user platform assures the management and trusted
execution of the code in Ad-hoc networks. Trusted boot
process is carried out to attest the OS kernel and trusted agent
by the service platform using TPM.
Satem uses trusted boot to establish trusted computing base
incorporating trusted agent as well as the entire OS kernel.
Where no component in the boot sequence can bypass the
any other without verifying its integrity and authenticity, thus
each component attests the next one before handing over the
control. A same like system is also used in satem; Being a
linux based system all the boot attestation results are stored in
TPM. Since TPM computes the SHA-1 hash over the BIOS
image, BIOS computes the SHA1 hash over Linux Loader
(LILO), and LILO does the same for the OS kernel. This
helps the OS kernel and agent to be trusted and proves the
system to be genuine.
E. EMSCB: European Multilaterally Secure Computing Base
EMSCB [27] is a German project involving Inﬁneon, SAP,
Blaupunkt, Sirrix, Universities of Bochum and Dresden. It is
based on the PERSEUS[39] Security Framework and the L4
[40] microkernel.
EMSCB is actively pursuing the development of a secure
kernel for common usage [27]. And Turaya is the security
architecture by EMSCB. PERSEUS and L4 serves as its basis.
Integrity of security Kernel is veriﬁed by the TPM [41]. Two
prototype applications have been implemented:
• Disk encryption (Turaya.Crypt)
• VPN communication (Turaya.VPN)
Turaya.Crypt implements a device encryption module and
provides transparent encryption scheme from users. It is
mainly used for removable devices like USB [41].
Turaya.VPN implements a tranparent and secure VPN
communication and encryption module. which is based on
IPSec [41].
F. Minimal TCB Code Execution
McCune et al [42] have proposed a Secure Execution
Architecture (SEA) with a dramatic decrease in trusted
computing base (TCB) code which efﬁciently isolates the
sensitive code from unnecessary process intervention. SEA
takes advantage of AMD’s SVM and Intel’s TXT since these
platforms guarantee hardware based root of trust and security
measures without a system reboot.
In the next section, we present the basic threat models in
cases where TC is not implemented.
V. ADVERSARY MODEL
A. Physical Attack
Refers to direct physical access to security devices or there
inner components. For example, the attacker may open a hole
in the passivation layer of a microcontroller chip and place a
micro-probing needle on a bus line in order to capture a signal
[43].
Hardware assisted security used in 1980s was highly
exposed to physical attacks. As an attacker expert in precision
drilling could make his way through. Since batteries were used
to hold crypto information and were required to be changed for
maintenance, technical personnel operating these batteries for
routine checkup could easily uncover the secure information
held in. IBM 4758 came up with a solution by placing these
batteries outside the secure primitives and deploying temper
resistant membranes on top of it.
Secondly, the cost of technology helps avoid physical
attacks while these devices are becoming more complex and
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TPM STRENGTHS & CHALLENGES
Strengths & Challenges TPM Concern TPM Prposed solution
S/W Attack
√
–
Platform Integrity
√
CRTM/Remote Attestation
H/W Attack × –
AES Encryption × –
Conﬁdentiality of data& S/w
√
Credential Encryption/hash calculation
Integrity of data& S/w
√
Credential Encryption/hash calculation
Certiﬁcate Mgt.
√
Veriﬁed by CA
Unauthorised N/W access
√
H/W prorection of sensitive data
VPN Support
√
Trusted Network Connect(TNC)
Key Security
√
RSA Encryption
Platform Veriﬁcation
√
SHA–1 Hashes
Unique Nonce/Key Generation
√
RNG
TPM Integrity
√
Endorsement Keys
Network Identity
√
Trusted Network Connect(TNC)
Digital Rights management(DRM) × TPM does not directly address DRM
Anti-Worm Protection × –
expensive. This excludes a major class of active attackers.
Although TPM is active in providing crypto processing, it is
yet not been able to provide protection against the physical
attacks.
B. Remote Attack
Types of remote attacks include timing analysis, cryptanaly-
sis, protocol analysis and attacks on application programming
interfaces. Cryptanalysis and protocol analysis are well known
attacks where the security threats exploit the ﬂaws in design
such as hash algorithms in the former case and in the latter
case, uses the ﬂaws in the systems which uses these crypto
standards and designs [43].
The TPM can protect against attacks on software integrity
only. If an adversary compromises a system, BIOS or the
critical information residing on the physical memory, TPM
will not disclose the secrets.
There is another class of attacks permitted by TPM barring
additional counter measures. Suppose a protected object has
value v0 at time t0 and v1 = v0 at time t1 > t0. If the
adversary makes a copy of the hard disk at time t0, the
adversary can restore the value v0 by powering down the
system and loading the old copy. For some applications, this
attack can have serious ramiﬁcations (e.g., it might permit the
adversary to restore revoked privileges or spent e-cash, or roll
back a security-critical software upgrade)[44].
VI. STRENGTHS AND CHALLENGES OF TRUSTED
COMPUTING
Ever increasing data security need requires challenging
security hardware. Systems protected with TPMs will not
only protect data but also keep the integrity of the data
uncompromised. TPM limits the access to the data–from any
threat or an individual from an open environment like internet
seeking access to the data stored–without the provision of
original credentials . TPM also encrypts the data stored, even
an un-authorised software attempting to access the secure data
will be blocked- sealed off the memory [45].
Since the TPM cannot differentiate a potential user or
an adversary, this poses a serious challenge. Any potential
user seeking access to the secure system will also be treated
as a threat. User failing to provide or losing credentials or
forgetting a password can have dire consequences. [45]. Table
III summarizes these strengths and challenges.
VII. FUTURE WORK
TPM enabled operating systems and other softwares are
currently under development and will be available next year,
which will take the data security to an entirely new level.
It can be clearly viewed that high processing capabilities at
PC level like Quad and Octa cores from Intel and AMD
may boost cryptographic computations that ultimately can
effect the TPM’s embedded in the systems. Also the TPM
performance is related to upcoming Virtualization techniques,
thus, if the size and complexity of the virtual machines and
trusted computing code can be substantially decreased it will
have better performance results as in [42]. The most recent
work is to from [31] as they have proposed MAC and selinux
for trusted embedded systems using ARM core.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a concise overview of trusted
computing initiative and its evolution. A brief summary
of modern industry standards and models are described.
Finally, TCG speciﬁc applications and general threat model is
explained. Thus, TPM based security measures will become
more efﬁcient and widespread with increase in computation
power and reduction in size and complexity of virtualization
technologies.
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